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Introduction	  
 
In December 2013, Uruguay became the first country in the world to fully legalize 
cannabis1, regulating all processes from the possession, growth, and distribution of 
the plant. As a breakthrough in the international drug control regime, it reflects the 
rapidly shifting paradigm towards drug policies in Latin America. The international 
and mostly U.S. led attempt to eliminate the production, transport, sale and 
consumption of so-classified illicit drugs, or narcotic and psychotropic drugs, has 
been for several decades an important dynamic in the relations, movements and 
conflicts across all of the Americas. The social and human costs have been very high 
and an increasingly larger amount of activists, politicians and researchers have spoken 
out against this often called ‘war on drugs’ and have sought for alternatives to avoid 
the costs paid by society. These alternatives mostly focus on cannabis, the most 
consumed illicit2 drug worldwide (UNODC: 2014, 41). Accordingly, this paper will 
mostly limit its scope on the specific role of cannabis. Though the prohibitionist 
model continues to prevail in the region, an increasing amount of countries have 
decriminalized cannabis and the reform debates in the region have gradually gained 
legitimacy and importance in the past few years. Due to the importance and impacts 
that these transnational trends have in the region, this paper will assess what role the 
legalization of cannabis in Uruguay has played in the discourse towards drug policies 
in Latin America. The objective of this study is to analyze the Latin American 
paradigm shift away from prohibitionism and towards the regulation of cannabis as an 
alternative to the war on drugs and, in such context, the decreasing hegemony of the 
U.S. in the region. The case study, more specifically, will look at the transnational 
effects that Uruguay’s decision has had in the region to reinforce these trends.  
 
Academic literature on the topic is very large and the topic has regained 
much focus in recent years due to the quickly changing dynamics and uncertainties. 
Since Latin America has only recently, especially since 2009, taken over the 
leadership in this field, the topic is fresh and dynamic. The case of Uruguay is even 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Cannabis plant is a genus of herbs with different species, the most commonly known 
one being marihuana, which is characterized by its psychoactive and physiological effects.  
2 Illicit according to the UN conventions on drugs, see paragraph 1.1.1 
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more recent (2013) and scholars have been very eager to analyze its implications, 
especially at the international level. Though Uruguay has received much attention and 
reputation internationally, the new law (19.172) had been preceded by important 
international debates, which urged precisely for that what Uruguay did, namely the 
experimentation of new models of legal regulation of drugs (see paragraph 1.3.1.). 
The rising debates in the region have especially been involved in this issue by 
addressing the social and human costs of the prohibitionist model as the presence of 
criminal drug traffickers and organizations in the region have generated a lot of 
violence and corruption and cost many human lives. With an emerging human rights 
and harm reduction approach, Latin American leaders have spoken out in favor of 
reforms. With the reform debate gaining centrality in the regional agendas, Uruguay 
made use of the situation to become the first country in the world to legalize cannabis 
and is since then under close watch of the international community, which hopes to 
find valuable lessons from the successes or failures of such experimental legalization 
model. The transnational relevance of drug policies is evident, since their effects and 
influences will always transcend borders and therefore require a strong transnational 
cooperation as the production, sale, and transport of drugs generally crosses many 
borders and consumer markets across the region. Hence, this paper will bring a 
transnational perspective into the discussion by analyzing the role of this specific case 
in the broader Latin American discourse toward drug policies. 	  
Firstly, there will be an overview of some of the most relevant literature 
and academic debates on the topic, introducing key concepts, discussions and ideas 
within the larger framework of the case study. These include the description of the 
International Drug Control Regime, the debates on the social costs and benefits of 
legalizing cannabis, and the analysis of the shifting power relations in the Americas. 
Chapter II then follows with a more detailed historical context by looking at the rise 
and decline of cannabis prohibition in the Americas and its counter-movements. 
Subsequently, the analysis will look at how Uruguay’s legalization of cannabis has 
played an important role Latin America’s current discourse towards drug policies. 
Lastly, this paper will present an overview of the main conclusions drawn from the 
analysis. 
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I.	  The	  Role	  of	  Cannabis	  Internationally,	  in	  the	  Americas,	  and	  in	  
Scholarly	  Debate	  
 
In most countries in the world and in the Americas, a prohibitionist approach towards 
cannabis regulation has prevailed for several decades. Currently, however, 
increasingly more governments are opting for alternatives away from such approach, 
towards the decriminalization of the drug and even its legalization. This chapter will 
give an introduction to the international legal framework on drug policies, the 
academic discussions on the social costs and benefits of cannabis legalization, and the 
shifting paradigms in the Americas regarding the drug reform debates. 
 
1.1.	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  International	  Drug	  Control	  Regime	  	  	  
1.1.1.	  UN	  Conventions	  on	  Drugs	  and	  Cannabis	  
 
For an effective prohibition of cannabis and other illicit drugs, the international 
community saw the need for global cooperation and has therefore been developing the 
international drug control regime since 19123, a system that has been dictating the 
rules and policies on a global level. Currently, there are three UN drug control 
conventions in place, defining the international standards that domestic policies 
should apply regarding the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, 
trade in, use and possession of a range of drugs: The 1961 Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. In 
all of these conventions, cannabis or its compounds have been scheduled in the 
categories of the most dangerous drugs with little or no therapeutic value, 
representing a threat to public health. Graph 1, below, illustrates the different 
Schedules under these conventions, cannabis being in Schedule I and IV of the 1961 
convention and Table 1 of the 1988 one, and THC4 being in Schedule IV of the 1971 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Further details about the history of drug prohibitionism can be found in subsection 2.1 
4 THC stands for Tetrahydrocannabinol, the main psychoactive compound in cannabis and is 
often used by pharmaceutical industries, especially in its purer chemical formulation, 
dronabinol (Bewley-Taylor et al.: 2014, 26).
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convention. Due to the global scope and important socio-economic and political 
impacts these conventions have had, especially in the Americas, there exists a large 
body of literature targeting these treaties, criticizing their flaws and incongruences, 
and often appealing to policy makers to take alternative routes (Barra: 2015, Bennet 
and Walsh: 2014, Swift et al.: 2000). In an extensive report on the history of cannabis 
 
Graph 1. Schedules under the UN drug control conventions. 
  
Source. Bewley-Taylor, D., T. Blickman, and M. Jelsma: 2014, 23 
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in the UN drug control system, Bewley-Taylor, Blickman and Jelsma analyze the rise 
and decline of cannabis prohibition and lay out options for reform. They point out the 
dubious reasons cannabis was scheduled amongst the most dangerous and medically 
non-useful drugs due to the pressure of some powerful stakeholders such as the U.S. 
and explain how the treaties have been facing increasingly higher tensions between 
the political ideologies and the scientific evidences of the therapeutic values of the 
plant (2014). Since 1989, the UN World Health Organization (WHO) expert 
committee has repeatedly acknowledged the therapeutic value of THC and 
recommended its rescheduling to less stringent classifications, even to schedule IV of 
the 1971 convention, but has only achieved to push for a transfer of dronabinol to 
Schedule II in 1991 (26). 
 
1.1.2.	  The	  Three	  Main	  Legal	  Approaches	  for	  Cannabis	  Regulation	  
 
Drug policies are not always straightforward, especially for the regulation of 
cannabis, differing in what degree, circumstances, or purposes it is forbidden or 
allowed. The three main pathways are prohibition, decriminalization, and legalization 
(Arrarás and Bello-Pardo: 2015, 174). The first one has been the prevailing choice of 
policy worldwide and throughout the Americas, prohibiting or banning the 
production, sale, possession and consumption of the drug and treating all of these acts 
as crimes. As an alternative to the prohibitionist model, a growing number of 
countries (and individual states) have opted for less severe models while still adhering 
to the international drug treaties by exploring the scope and limits of these. The most 
common practices after the prohibition are the legalization for medical or scientific 
research and the decriminalization of use and possession of small amounts, which are 
then treated as civil instead of as criminal matters. Boister explains the rationale 
countries use for such decriminalization: while none of the UN conventions requires 
the drug consumption to be a punishable offence, they do require the possession to be 
criminalized. The loophole is, however, that it “does not appear that article 36(1) [of 
the 1961 Convention] obliges parties to criminalize possession of drugs for personal 
use” (2001, 81). Finally, there is the option of full legalization of all aspects of the 
cycle from production to sale and consumption, Uruguay, Colorado and Washington 
being the first places in the world to do so. Nonetheless, their approaches differ 
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significantly. While Colorado and Washington on the one hand have adopted a “free 
market legalization” model with very limited state restrictions on the production and 
possession of the products (Pardo: 2014, 733), Uruguay, on the other hand, has 
decided for a “legalization and regulation” model by carefully regulating every step 
and setting precise limits on the production and purchase of cannabis for each 
individual or group (Arrarás and Bello-Pardo: 2015, 174). Subsection 3.1 will explain 
this model in more detail. 
 
1.2.	  Social	  Costs	  and	  Benefits	  of	  Cannabis	  Legalization	  	  
1.2.1.	  Therapeutic	  Values	  of	  Cannabis	  &	  the	  Harm	  Reduction	  Approach	  
 
Academic debates on the legalization of cannabis typically discuss on the one hand 
the positive or negative health effects of the drug on individuals and on the other hand 
the effects that legalization would have on society as a whole, regulating it like other 
drugs such as alcohol and tobacco. Regarding the health effects, the scientific 
community is relatively divided. Some point towards the damaging long-term effects 
on the brain and lungs, especially on minors, and the high potential for addiction 
(Mönckeberg: 2014, 233-235, Venegas: 2014, 655-656), while others emphasize its 
therapeutic values, including (chronic) pain relief, glaucoma remedial as well as 
cancer and AIDS treatment (Callado: 2012, 79-82). It has been recognized, 
nevertheless, that cannabis has much lower levels of toxicity than alcohol and tobacco 
and that there are no known cases of death or overdoses related to cannabis (Callado: 
2012, 83), which is an argument that has been frequently used in favor of the legal 
regulation of such drug. Furthermore, from a health perspective, the harm reduction 
approach has increasingly been used, which views prohibitionist drug policies as 
more harmful than the drug use itself. If a drug is legalized, or at least decriminalized, 
users can be treated as patients and not as criminals, because “the public health 
consequences of the application of the criminal law against cannabis users may be at 
least as significant as those that flow directly from cannabis use itself” (Swift et al.: 
2000, 106). In 2001, Portugal experimented with such harm reduction approach and 
decriminalized the use of all (previously illicit) drugs, thereby offering treatments to 
consumers who did not need to fear criminal prosecution anymore. According to a 
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report by the Cato institute, the measure accomplished to decrease consumption and 
drug-related diseases and death cases as well as increasing the attendance to treatment 
programs, concluding that “the data show that, judged by virtually every metric, the 
Portuguese decriminalization framework has been a resounding success” (Greenwald: 
2009, 1). 
 
1.2.2.	  Human	  Rights	  &	  Peace	  Perspectives	  towards	  Drug	  Legalization	  
 
Literature from Latin America discussing the legalization of cannabis or other drugs 
clearly reflects a growing human rights and peace based approach towards drug 
polices as the region has been strongly hit by the collateral effects of the war on drugs 
on socio-political aspects. Urging for a new paradigm, Vergara assessed the failure 
that the combat against drug traffickers has been all around Latin America, despite the 
large investments and decades of struggles. Since the 1990s, while the big drug 
trafficking organizations (DTOs) were being cracked down, these have been 
fragmenting into smaller cartels to survive with the same effectiveness in delivering 
their services to the continuous demand for illicit drugs in the U.S. and the rest of the 
Americas (2015, 118). Furthermore, these have been constantly displacing to new and 
secure places after being found by the authorities (the so-called “balloon effect” 
(126)). Power conflicts between criminal drug organizations and public authorities 
have led to increased violence (127), as was the case in the Mexican drug war where 
an estimated 70.000 people died from 2006 to 2012 (Rosen and Zepeda: 2015, 97). 
Fonseca and Pestana illustrate the problems that these organizations can cause on 
democratic governance with the case of Honduras, the “most violent, non-warring 
country in the world”, where “drug trafficking has become an important source of 
revenue for corrupt officials and security personnel, undermining Honduran political 
will to combat [DTOs]” (2015, 119). Hence, in order to reduce the criminality, 
corruption and violence rates and to avoid the excessive power accumulation of drug 
traffickers, reformists suggest the legal regulation as an alternative for the state to take 
the power away from criminal organizations and focus on the public health of the 
population (Barra: 2015, 91-92). Some studies have already linked the 
implementation of medical marijuana laws in some U.S. states with the decline in 
violence related to DTOs in Mexico (Gavrilova et al.: 2015, 27-28) and expect a 
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significant loss of profits for cartels thanks to the recent legalization in some states 
(Kilmer et al.: 2010, 43-45). Other scholars warn, though, that criminal organizations 
are seeking other criminal activities to maintain their power and therefore need to be 
addressed not only by drug reform (Watt and Zepeda: 2015, 230). Furthermore, 
human rights advocates condemn the punitive approach towards drug consumers, the 
un-proportional sentences and the accordingly excessive imprisonment rates: 
“Throughout the region, cannabis smokers in particular are stigmatized and harassed 
by the police, and many people are in prison for growing or simple possession of 
cannabis. […] The weight of the law comes down on a specific part of the population: 
people with little education and scant resources, who are either unemployed or 
holding down informal-sector jobs.” (Metaal and Youngers: 2011, 6). Thus, a more 
humane approach is encouraged that does not come down hard on disadvantaged 
population sectors and offers assistance instead. 
 
1.3.	  Shifting	  Paradigms	  in	  the	  Americas	  in	  the	  Drug	  Debate	  	  
1.3.1.	  Latin	  America’s	  Regional	  Leadership	  in	  Drug	  Policy	  Reforms	  
 
The current drug reform debates have been reflecting the shifting power relations in 
the Western hemisphere, characterized by a strengthened role of Latin America vis-à-
vis the declining U.S. influence in the region. “The frustration with the failure of the 
U.S. ‘war on drugs’ approach and the collateral damage left in its wake has grown 
across the region at a time when U.S. influence is steadily declining” (Youngers: 
2015, 21). In 2012, Armenta, Metaal, and Jelsma highlighted how Latin America is 
progressively moving away from the war on drugs, “clearly taking the lead on drug 
policy reform […]. A historical breakthrough is in the making” (2012, 14). This 
regional leadership has had significant impacts in recent years on the paradigm shift 
in the Americas, in which both former and sitting Latin American presidents have 
actively participated. In 2009, the Latin American Commission on Drugs and 
Democracy, led by former Brazilian president Cardoso, former Colombian president 
Gaviria, and former Mexican president Zedillo, published a report called Drugs & 
Democracy: Toward a paradigm shift, condemning the war on drugs as a failure and 
advocating for open debates, arguing that “the in-depth revision of current drug 
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policies is even more urgent in Latin America in light of their enormous human and 
social costs and threats to democratic institutions” (7). Two years later, in 2011, they 
came together again with the additional support of Vargas Llosa, Kofi Annan, and 
other influential people, and created the Global Commission on Drug Policy, 
reinforcing the debate and explicitly “encourag[ing] experimentation by governments 
with models of legal regulation of drugs (with cannabis, for example) that are 
designed to undermine the power of organized crime and safeguard the health and 
security of their citizens” (11). Hereby, the “drug policy debate had taken off and was 
front and center on the regional agenda” (Youngers: 2015, 21). Meanwhile, Bolivia’s 
president Morales denounced in 2009 the UN conventions regarding the ban of the 
coca leaf, a traditionally important plant in the Andean region. After the attempt to 
amend these laws failed, Bolivia exited the convention in 2012, but re-acceded with 
special rights in its territory on coca leaf production and consumption (Bewley-Taylor 
et al.: 2014, 61-2). 
 
1.3.2.	  Growing,	  but	  Incomplete,	  Consensus	  Amongst	  Latin	  American	  Leaders	  
 
Though the general atmosphere has moved toward open discussions on drug reforms, 
diverging opinions still remain within Latin America. The first sitting president in 
Latin America to openly support the idea of drug reform was Colombian president 
Juan Manuel Santos, who in 2011 stated that “if the world considers that legislation is 
a solution I would gladly go along with that. I can understand the benefits, and I can 
understand the arguments” (Rathbone and Mapstone). Soon after, Guatemalan 
president Otto Pérez Molina also expressed his accordance towards the idea and tried 
to bring his Central American counterparts into the discussions for future meetings 
(Youngers: 2015, 23). As a result of Santos’ and Molina’s lobbying efforts in the 
sixth hemispheric presidential summit in 2012 in Cartagena, Colombia, “the 
presidents were tasking the Organization of American States (OAS) with producing a 
report analyzing the results of present policies and exploring more effective 
alternatives” (23). By 2013, the OAS published the expected report, reinforced the 
debate toward the need for reform like the 2009 and 2011 reports mentioned before, 
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and presented four future scenarios5 for the drug problem in the Americas in order to 
encourage the debate and “provide a useful starting point for helping our leaders and, 
ultimately, our peoples establish collective and sustainable roadmaps within the 
diversity of approaches” (The Drug Problem in the Americas 9). The reactions to the 
OAS report in 2013 reflected well the differences amongst Latin American leaders, as 
mentioned above. While Uruguay, Colombia, and Guatemala embraced the report for 
further debate, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Peru were more resistant. Brazil and 
Mexico, meanwhile, kept a more cautious position at first, though later Mexico 
adopted an important leadership role in the regional debate and within the United 
Nations (Youngers: 2015, 25). Before Uruguay fully legalized cannabis in December 
2013, Bolivia, Colombia, Honduras, Costa Rica and Guatemala were still applying a 
fully prohibitionist approach towards cannabis, while Brazil and Ecuador were 
pending decriminalization, Chile, Venezuela and El Salvador had it partially 
decriminalized, and Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Peru and Mexico had the 
possession of small quantities6 fully decriminalized (Transnational Institute: 2015). 
Chapter III will look further into how Uruguay’s decision has influenced Latin 
America’s discourse toward drug policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 “Together, Pathways, Resilience, and Disruption.” The legal regulation of cannabis is 
suggested in some of these scenarios by the OAS Scenario Team 
6 The definition of small quantities of cannabis can range from 2 grams like in El Salvador, 5 
grams in Mexico, 8 grams in Peru and 10 grams in Paraguay (Transnational Institute: 2015). 
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II.	  The	  History	  behind	  Cannabis	  Prohibition	  and	  its	  Counter-­‐
movements	  
 
Cannabis has been used for centuries for religious and medicinal purposes in some 
parts of the world, while its use was rare in Western societies until the 20th century. 
Followed by the international cooperation that the ban on opium brought about, the 
scope of the international legal discussions soon included cannabis into the list of 
prohibited drugs. This chapter will dig deeper into the history of cannabis prohibition, 
the reasons behind it, and the recent counter-movements in favor of legalizing the 
drug fully or at least for medicinal uses. For this purpose, the war on drugs, the 
changing role of the U.S., and the progress of Latin American regional cooperation 
will also be analyzed. 
 
2.1.	  The	  Rise	  and	  Decline	  of	  Cannabis	  Prohibition	  
 
2.1.1.	  The	  Constructed	  Image	  of	  Drugs	  and	  its	  Perception	  
 
In 1912, the Hague Opium Convention established for the first time guidelines for 
internationally coordinated drug control. Though it was focused on the ban of opium, 
some delegations introduced the discussions on cannabis regulation and some first 
regulatory strategies were incorporated. “Many delegates were bewildered by the 
introduction of cannabis into the discussions. Pharmaceutical cannabis products were 
widespread in the early 20th century and the participants had no substantive 
knowledge, due to lack of statistics on international trade or even a clear scientific 
definition of the substance” (Bewley-Taylor et al.: 2014, 13). The use of cannabis is a 
relatively recent phenomenon in most Western societies and, at the time when the 
prohibitionist paradigm was being pushed forward, most countries had no experience 
with the drug and no regulatory model in place until the Hague Opium Convention 
started pushing many into a prohibitionist direction (11-14). In several African and 
South Asian societies such as Egypt and India, however, the use dates back many 
centuries and has been integrated into some religious and cultural traditions (9). It is 
considered that the plant entered the Americas with the arrival of African slaves in the 
16th century in Brazil, where the white colonial elite then associated the drug with 
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lower classes, slaves, and criminals, considering it as primitive custom incompatible 
with their “civilized” life style (10). Similarly, the U.S. elite has demonized cannabis 
based on certain racial and social associations, especially under the powerful 
international influence of Harry Anslinger, who headed the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics from 1930 to 1962 and lobbied towards an international prohibitionist 
paradigm and the first UN Convention on drugs in 1961 (Gerber: 2004, 4-16). In 
1937, pushing towards federal prohibition, Anslinger explicitly stated: “Most 
marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, jazz musicians, and entertainers. Their 
satanic music is driven by marijuana, and marijuana smoking by white women makes 
them want to seek sexual relations with Negroes” (9). As explained in paragraph 
1.1.1, the UN Conventions on drugs of 1961, 1971, and 1988 then embedded such 
prohibitionist paradigm into international law backed by political pressures rather 
than scientific evidence.  
 
2.1.2.	  From	  Prohibition	  to	  Popularity?	  
 
Ironically, as Bewley-Taylor et al. point out, “these efforts at the UN aiming to reduce 
and ultimately eliminate cannabis “abuse” coincided with its growing popularity and 
increasingly widespread use; a trend that was closely associated with emerging 
countercultural movements within many Western countries, including the U.S., during 
the 1960s” (2014, 4). Soon enough, cannabis shook off its previous marginal 
associations and became integrated into mainstream culture in many countries 
throughout the world (8). According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC), it is the most consumed illicit drug worldwide, with 125 million to 
227 million users, between 2.7 and 4.9 per cent of the world population aged 15-64 
(2014, 41). Graph 2, below, illustrates the use of cannabis per country. With the 
increased scientific research in the past decades on the plant, the perception has 
shifted, acknowledging its low risks and therapeutic values (see paragraph 1.2.1.). In 
the U.S., for example, support for legalization grew from 12 per cent in 1969 to 58 in 
2013 (Swift: 2013). Throughout Latin America, the polls reflect that the majority still 
opposes legalization, but strongly endorses its medicinal uses: In Mexico, 72% 
oppose legalization, while 73% favor its medicinal use (Centro de Estudios Sociales y 
de Opinión Pública: 2014), in Chile, 52% and 86% respectively (Cadem: 2014), and 
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in Uruguay it is 58% and 74% (Powell: 2013). Even though several countries in Latin 
America have decriminalized the possession of small quantities, the support for 
medicinal marihuana had not translated into concrete policies for such purposes until 
Uruguay legalized it. Subsection 3.3 will show the measures that some governments 
took afterwards.  
 
Graph 2. Use of Cannabis in 2012 (or latest year available) 
 
Source. UNODC. Web. <http://www.unodc.org/wdr2014/> 
 
2.2.	  War	  on	  Drugs	  in	  the	  Americas	  
 
2.2.1.	  U.S.	  Hegemony	  in	  the	  International	  Drug	  Control	  Regime	  
 
When digging into the dimensions of the international drug control regime, it is 
unavoidable to address the so-called war on drugs. The term came to use since 1971 
when Richard Nixon, former U.S. president officially declared the ‘war on drugs’ 
under the reasoning that the consumption and trafficking of illicit drugs represented a 
threat to national security. It is estimated that the costs of the forty-year war has 
reached approximately $1 trillion (drug policy alliance: 2014) and has had an 
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enormous influence in Latin America, the target area for the U.S. to combat drugs. 
According to Castells’ analysis, “Latin American-based drug traffic is an essential 
component of American crime, to the point that U.S. policy toward Latin America is 
dominated by the obsession to fight drugs traffic at the point of supply. This is an 
impossible task, but one that has entirely transformed U.S. – Latin American relations 
from old-fashioned imperialism to hysterical pursuit of a vanishing enemy, which, in 
its repeated escapes, blows up entire political systems” (1998, 195). Since the 1990s, 
an extensive body of literature has emerged, especially in the U.S., criticizing and 
condemning the war on drugs, particularly for its harmful impacts in Latin America 
(Duke and Gross: 1993, Youngers and Rosin: 2005, Loveman: 2006) and for the 
excessive militarization of the U.S. operations in the region (Isacson: 2005). In a 
recent compilation of scholarly articles on ‘Cooperation and Drug Policies in the 
Americas’, it is emphasized that the over-arching argument of the book is that “so 
much of the past efforts in the war on drugs have lacked ‘true’ cooperation. Instead, 
as the main provider of support and resources, the United States has dictated the 
agenda and conditions of drug policies, focusing on bilateral initiatives” (Zepeda and 
Rosen: 2015, xvi). 
 
2.2.2.	  U.S.’	  Decreased	  Credibility	  and	  Influence	  in	  Latin	  America	  
 
While the U.S. has been promoting the war on drugs internationally, the trends at the 
domestic level were increasingly contradicting such stance. Surveys have shown the 
changing attitudes of the American population, opening up to the legalization of 
cannabis, with 58 per cent in favor in 2013 as opposed to the 12 per cent in 1969 and 
the 31 per cent in 2001 (Swift: 2013). In November 2012, Colorado and Washington 
State passed their ballot initiatives approved by the majority of the voters, thereby 
fully legalizing cannabis. In November 2014, Alaska, Oregon and Washington D.C. 
also passed such ballots. Furthermore, over 21 states have decided to allow the use of 
medical marihuana and 14 have decriminalized its possession since 1996 (Bewley-
Taylor et al.: 2015, 54). Despite the growing number of changing state laws, cannabis 
remains illegal under federal law. Though the Obama administration announced that it 
would not enforce these federal laws on the states that passed the legalization bills in 
order to respect their sovereignty, the federal government maintains its prohibitions 
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approach abroad. Due to such incongruence, the U.S. has suffered a loss of moral 
authority and integrity in the combat against drugs. In April 2014, Colombian 
president Santos declared in an interview: “How do I explain to a peasant in 
Colombia that I have to put him in prison for growing marijuana when in Colorado or 
in Washington state, it's legal to buy the same marijuana?” (De Córdoba: 2014), and 
Mexican president Peña Nieto also made hints to the inconsistency of U.S. domestic 
policies with regional ones: “Once California has permitted recreational marijuana, 
maintaining the ban in Mexico won't be sustainable” (Graham: 2014). In addition to 
its lost credibility in the region, U.S. foreign policy has been shifting its focus since 
the terrorist attacks of 2001, concentrating on the Middle East and the war on 
terrorism, and recently also to the influential Asian economies, leading to a decreased 
interest and presence in Latin America “as the fast shrinking funds for Plan Colombia 
and the Mérida Initiative clearly show” (Horwitz: 2015, 200). All in all, the decreased 
credibility and presence of the U.S. in the region since 2001 help explain Latin 
America’s increased leadership in drug policy reforms. The next subsection will 
expand more on the history of regional cooperation. 
 
2.3.	  Latin	  America’s	  Regional	  Cooperation	  and	  the	  Role	  of	  Drugs	  
 
2.3.1.	  Why	  the	  Desire	  for	  Self-­‐Determination	  has	  Prevailed	  Over	  the	  Interest	  in	  
Regional	  Cooperation	  in	  Latin	  America	  
 
The common historical background of European colonialism throughout the Americas 
has had significant consequences in the cooperative attitudes of these countries. Ever 
since independence, Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) states have sought for 
regional unity and cooperation, whilst also protecting their sovereignty and right to 
self-determination (Horwitz: 2015, 199). After independence, the cooperative spirit 
was however quickly replaced by an environment of mutual distrust due to the 
numerous territorial disputes and wars between states in addition to the frequent civil 
wars. Though most took place in the 19th century, the 20th century also witnessed 
several wars and diplomatic disputes, the last one being as recent as 1995 between 
Ecuador and Peru, known as the Cenepa War. Furthermore, the processes of sub-
regional integration that emerged mostly since the 1980s have divided LAC states 
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into different ideological blocks, having MERCOSUR, Alianza del Pacífico, the 
Andean Community, and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, 
amongst other blocs, seeking for increased regional authority and global influence. 
However, when assessing the main difficulties that these processes of regional 
integration face, Rueda-Junquera points out the continuing reluctance of LAC states 
to share sovereignty in order to prioritize national objectives (2009, 66). Horwitz 
argues that “overall, LAC authorities seem to prefer multilateral forums with limited 
scope, narrow obligations, and vague goals. In essence, when looking for ways to act 
multilaterally, LAC states seem to prefer a wide range of instruments that require no 
major commitments. This is why as a rule, the Inter-American system tends to be 
unruly and ineffective, and it is so by design” (2015, 216). 
 
2.3.2.	  Drugs	  and	  their	  Threat	  to	  Democracy:	  Reasons	  for	  Latin	  American	  Unity?	  
 
Drug policies are a political concern that affects the entire Western hemisphere and 
cannot be confined to individual states. Since drug trafficking and organized crime are 
transnational phenomena almost by definition, transcending borders and displacing 
their operations across states when necessary, drug policies require coherent 
multilateral and regional cooperation to effectively resolve the problems (Zepeda and 
Rosen: 2015, xvi). Therefore, the question is whether the drug problems, and the 
corresponding security threats that these represent for the region, are reasons 
compelling enough for LAC states to unite. More recently, the Union of South 
American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean 
States (CELAC) are attempts to deepen South American and Latin American 
integration. In the case of the latter, it is clear that it was created to strengthen its 
geopolitical role vis-à-vis the powerful North, as the U.S., Canada, and the European 
enclaves are excluded from the bloc (Vivares et al.: 2012, 32). In addition to the 
geopolitical reasons, though, these blocs seem determined to find more concrete 
reasons for further unity and a common security approach has been one of them, 
especially under decreasing U.S. influence: “LAC societies are realizing that they do 
not need the United States to start changing the drug paradigm” (Horwitz: 2015, 207). 
An especially compelling argument Latin American leaders are acknowledging for 
uniting against the drug problems is the threat that illegal DTOs frequently represent 
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to democratic governance throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. More and 
more Latin American leaders advocated for a new drug paradigm (see paragraph 
1.3.1.) and in 2009, the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy 
particularly emphasized how “some of the powers responsible for maintaining order 
and structure have been co-opted by organized crime, and the corrupting power of 
drug money penetrates all levels of public authority and corrodes the basis of 
democracy” (38). Taking power away from criminal hands has been one of Uruguay’s 
arguments justifying the legalization of cannabis. The following chapter will analyze 
this new experimental model, the motives behind it, the domestic and international 
reactions and repercussions and the role it plays in Latin America’s new discourse 
towards drug policies. 
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III.	  “Uruguay	  Regula”:	  The	  Rationale,	  Obstacles	  and	  Regional	  
Role	  of	  Cannabis	  Legalization	  in	  Uruguay	  
 
Despite the growing academic literature and public opinions advocating for drug 
reforms, political action has been limited. In December 2013, the Uruguayan 
government took the bold step of challenging the status quo and becoming the first 
country in the world to fully legalize cannabis. This chapter will analyze the rationale 
behind the decision, its domestic and international obstacles, and repercussions in the 
region. Moreover, it will assess in detail the role that the cannabis legalization in 
Uruguay has played in Latin America’s new discourse towards drug policies. 
 
3.1.	  Uruguay’s	  Rationale	  behind	  the	  Legalization	  of	  Cannabis	  
 
3.1.1.	  State	  Regulation	  vs.	  Black	  Markets	  
 
“The traditional approach hasn’t worked. Someone has to be the first [to try this]” 
were José Mujica’s words regarding the government’s decision to legalize cannabis 
(Bewley-Taylor et al.: 2014, 7), the primary justification therefore being the failure of 
the war on drugs. Graph 3, below, offers an overview of why and how Uruguay is 
regulating cannabis. In short, Law 19.172 grants three legal possibilities to access 
cannabis: (1) self-farming, meaning that a registered individual may grow up to six 
cannabis plants and up to 480 grams per year, (2) registered cannabis clubs7, which 
can grow each up to 99 plants, allow between 15 and 45 members, and can only 
supply each member with up to 480 grams per year, (3) state-run pharmacies, where 
each registered customer may purchase up to 40 grams of government-licensed 
cannabis per month. For all of these alternatives, the consumers need to be 18 years or 
older, of Uruguayan citizenship or residence, not use it in public spaces, and be 
registered at the regulating government agency Instituto de Regulación y Control de 
Cannabis (IRCCA) (Asamblea General: 2014). As explained in paragraph 1.1.2, the 
Uruguayan government is thereby adopting a “legalization and regulation” model by 
monopolizing the control over all of the processes, instead of setting the rules for a  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 ‘Cannabis clubs’ are membership associations where the service is exclusively provided to 
registered members. 
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Graph 3. Uruguay’s Model for the Legalization of Cannabis 
 
Source. Bewley-Taylor, D., T. Blickman, and M. Jelsma: 2014, 7 
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free market model like in Colorado and Washington State. Moreover, the government 
followed the rationale discussed in paragraph 1.2.2 of undermining the illegal market 
by taking the trade and production away from criminal hands, as well as avoiding that 
cannabis users come in contact with more harmful drugs from those markets, such as 
cocaine paste paco8. The government announced that one of its strategies to combat 
the black market would be the effective competition with the street prices by selling 
the cannabis at a lower price, hinting at an initial price of $1 a gram (Goni: 2013). In 
addition, the initiative aims to increase tax collection and invest these earnings in the 
monitoring and enforcement laws, the treatment of those with addiction, education 
and prevention campaigns to prevent problematic drug use, and other social services 
(Arrarás and Bello-Pardo: 2015, 180).  
 
3.1.2.	  Human	  Rights	  &	  Security	  
 
Furthermore, the Uruguayan government has defended its initiative from a human 
rights and security perspective. According to Repetto, the project for cannabis 
regulation was presented for the first time in June 2012 as an issue of national security 
by the Uruguayan security cabinet due to the violence generated by the 
narcotrafficking and the growing civil demands for better security (2014, 13-14). 
Policy makers then started incorporating the perspectives of other stakeholders such 
as social organizations and the press who linked the issue also to public health and 
consumer rights (17-19). Raymond Yans, the president of the International Narcotics 
Control Board (INCB), which is responsible for the monitoring and support of 
governments’ compliance with the international drug control treaties, accused the 
Uruguayan government of adopting a “pirate attitude” regarding the UN conventions 
(Bewley-Taylor et al.: 2014, 36). Luis Porto, Uruguay’s Vice-minister, then justified 
to the INCB the new law based on its particular interpretation of the treaties: “given 
two possible interpretations of the provisions of the Convention, the choice should be 
for the one that best protects the human right in question, as stated in Article 29 of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In the Argentinean and Uruguayan drug markets, Pasta base de cocaina (PBC) “is defined as 
the residue from the manufacturing of cocaine hydrochloride. This final stage of processing 
may leave a residue that is sold as paco” (2006, 5) and is related to dangerous health risks for 
consumers (10). 
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American Convention on Human Rights”. Hence, he argues “that production and sale 
in the manner prescribed in the new law may be the best way, on the one hand, to 
combat drug trafficking, and on the other, to defend the constitutionally protected 
right to freedom of our fellow citizens” (59). 
 
3.2.	  Domestic	  and	  International	  Obstacles	  to	  the	  Project	  
 
3.2.1.	  Domestic	  Challenges	  to	  the	  Survival	  of	  the	  Project	  
 
Though the measure has been praised by drug reform advocates all over the world, 
there have been and continue to be internal obstacles and disputes. Firstly, there have 
been doubts whether the state control of all processes and users is the most 
appropriate model for legalization: “Given privacy concerns, questions remain 
regarding the willingness of those who grow at-home or seek to acquire cannabis by 
registering with the government” (Pardo: 2014, 734). The main obstacle, however, is 
the weak support. According to a survey conducted by the consultancy firm CIFRA, 
61 per cent of the Uruguayan population opposes the new law regulating cannabis, 28 
is in favor and 11 does not have an opinion (2013). Graph 4, below, also based on 
CIFRA’s surveys, illustrates the diverging opinions on the cannabis regulation 
according to voting preferences. Among the supporters of Mujica’s party Frente 
Amplio (Frentistas), 47 per cent favored the measure and 40 opposed it, while the 
supporters of the two biggest opposition parties, Partido Nacional (Blancos) and 
Partido Colorado (Colorados), were strongly against it, 85 and 87 per cent 
respectively. The first major obstacle that this divergence amongst the electorate 
meant for the project were the presidential elections in October and November 2014, 
almost one year after the law was passed, as opposition leaders were threatening to 
reverse the new cannabis laws if they were to win (Haberkorn: 2015). In the end, 
Tabaré Vázquez, the successor of José Mujica, won the elections with 56.62% of the 
votes in the second round. The project therefore finally counted with long-term 
political support to be implemented. Around 15 cannabis clubs and almost 2000 
domestic growers have registered at the IRCCA and, though the pharmacy sales were 
scheduled for early 2015, the new government rescheduled these for the end of the 
year stating that they had no hurry to do so (Delgado: 2015). Cannabis clubs and 
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domestic growers, however, cannot sell to the public. Respectively, there have been 
concerns and complains expressed about the increased risk of burglary and claim that 
the black market is far from dying as long as the pharmacies have not started selling 
cannabis to the public (Maseda: 2015). The government is deliberately slowing the 
pace of implementation, given the position of the new president who is not very keen 
on the legalization of cannabis, but promises to fulfill his party’s wish of 
implementing the law (Oppenheimer: 2015). It therefore remains to be seen whether 
the law will be fully implemented and whether the desired goals will be met, while 
the international community carefully studies their model, which has already been 
cited amongst Latin American leaders. The following paragraphs will further analyze 
the international obstacles and reactions. 
 
Graph 4. Opposition and support of the project to regulate cannabis, according to 
voting intentions. 
 
Source. CIFRA. <http://www.cifra.com.uy/novedades.php?idNoticia=205 
 
3.2.2.	  International	  Obstacles	  and	  their	  Limited	  Influence	  
 
While the project has faced critical challenges at the domestic level, the obstacles at 
the international level have not been as influential as might have been expected. As 
explained above, the Uruguayan government needed to deal with the criticisms by the 
INCB for challenging the UN conventions on drugs. Uruguay, as a signatory to all 
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three conventions (see paragraph 1.1.1), has made several efforts to justify the 
decision to the international community. Though the government has admitted the 
legal tensions of its new law with the conventions, it has capitalized on the 
interpretative latitude of the treaties and argued that “the spirit, as well as the 
regulations of Law No. 19.172, follow the philosophy of the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol and incorporate the bases 
established by it” (Bewley-Taylor et al.: 2015, 59). The United States, known for its 
interventions in the region and for promoting the prohibitionist paradigm at the UN, 
has not taken any noteworthy actions against the Uruguayan government. According 
to Arrarás and Bello-Pardo, the relationship between the two countries has not been 
negatively affected at all (2015, 187). In an interview, John Walsh of the Washington 
Office for Latin America points out that it was the right timing for the project. As 
increasingly more U.S. states are moving away from the prohibitionist model and five 
of them (including D.C.) have fully legalized cannabis as well, the “U.S. federal 
government is in a very awkward position to come down hard on a country like 
Uruguay [and] is going to be in a weak position to pressure other countries” (Inskeep: 
2013). This has allowed the continuance of the project and has put Uruguay in the 
forefront of the regional debates on drug reform. The greater resistance, at first, has 
rather come from some of its neighboring countries, “whose government officials 
have expressed concerns about whether locally-grown marijuana could cross 
Uruguay’s borders” (Arrarás and Bello-Pardo: 2015, 187). Paraguay’s head of the 
Anti-Drug Secretariat, for instance, disapproved of the project for fearing a rise in 
marijuana production and traffic in Paraguay (187). In addition, shortly before the law 
was passed, Brazilian federal depute Osmar Terra, working closely with president 
Rousseff, went with an official delegation to meet the health commission of the 
Uruguayan government in order to discourage the project to be approved (BBC: 
2013). And the Mexican chancellor Meade criticized Uruguay’s unilateral decision 
for not having sought a regional consensus first to an issue that transcends borders 
(infobae: 2013). Nevertheless, the project went ahead and in the end Uruguay 
received enough international support to sustain it. The following paragraphs will 
expand on the reactions throughout Latin America and reflect on the role of 
Uruguay’s decision to legalize cannabis in Latin America’s new discourse toward 
drug policies.  
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3.3.	  The	  Role	  of	  Uruguay’s	  Cannabis	  Legalization	  in	  Latin	  America	  
 
3.3.1.	  OAS,	  UNASUR	  &	  MERCOSUR:	  Uruguay’s	  Conquest	  for	  Regional	  Support	  
 
Uruguay’s role in the region is characterized by its small territorial and populational 
size.  As such, Mujica considered Uruguay to be the ideal laboratory for this 
“experiment”, as he called it, which could become “a contribution to humanity”, 
therefore asking for the support of the international community (El Observador: 
2013). One year after his statement, Uruguay was proclaimed by the Science 
Magazine as the global “beacon for marijuana research”, arguing that the “federal red 
tape continues to be an impediment to good science in the United States” (Wade: 
2014, 1217). Within the South American context, Uruguay has not played a 
significant role in the regional narcotrafficking, as Argentina and Brazil are the 
biggest consumer markets and Paraguay the largest producer of cannabis. It has, 
however, become an important financial hub for the circulation and the laundering of 
money linked to these drug-related illegal activities (Valdomir: 2015, 110). Though at 
first Argentina and Brazil expressed their concerns about the law and its 
consequences across the borders (“Preocupa a la region […]”: 2013), Uruguay’s 
marginal role in the regional drug network has facilitated the development of the 
project and has attracted the support of important stakeholders who are interested in 
the results of such ‘experiment’. Miguel Insulza, Secretary General of the OAS, 
approved of the project even before it was passed, as the Pan-American organization 
had previously admitted the failure of the war on drugs (Costa: 2013) as mentioned in 
paragraph 1.3.2. In September 2014, during his first tour around the region, Ernesto 
Samper, secretary general of UNASUR and ex-president of Colombia, publicly 
endorsed Uruguay’s decision and encouraged the political exchanges and discussions 
of experiences amongst the UNASUR members (Valdomir: 2015, 113). Two months 
later, the parliament of MERCOSUR included in its plenary session the discussion on 
how to reduce the harm and risks derived from drug consumption (112), which is a 
perspective that Uruguay has applied to justify its decision (see ‘harm reduction’ in 
paragraph 1.2.1). Uruguay has proven its leading role in the region not only by being 
the first country to legalize cannabis and promoting the discussions in all of Latin 
America, but also by bringing together the support of its regional neighbors towards a 
new paradigm with projects such as the OAS resolution entitled “the promotion and 
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protection of human rights in the search for a new focus and effective solutions, in the 
development and implementation of policies to address the global drugs problem in 
the Americas”. Promoted by Uruguay, it was co-sponsored by Argentina, supported 
by Ecuador, Mexico, Colombia and Guatemala, and adopted unanimously in the 44th 
plenary session of the OAS General Assembly (“Resolution on Drugs and Human 
Rights”: 2014).  
 
3.3.2.	  Uruguay’s	  Encouragement	  for	  new	  ‘Experiments’	  around	  the	  Region	  	  
 
Despite the uncertainties about its consequences and impacts, the Uruguayan model 
for cannabis regulation has quickly become a reference point for several countries 
around Latin America. At the time the law was passed, Pérez Salar featured an article 
on how Colombia and Mexico perceived Uruguay’s decision. Due to the high levels 
of drug-related violence in both countries, debates on legalization were previously 
existent, but were then brought to the forefront with significant interest in the results 
of Uruguay’s experiment (2013). Though the Mexican government is rather looking 
after the developments in the U.S. (see paragraph 2.2.2), Colombia and Guatemala 
have closely followed Uruguay’s case. In Colombia, the peace talks between the 
government and the FARC have also been addressing the role of illicit drugs. 
Recently, there have been calls to discuss the alternative path of legalization and as 
such, the Uruguayan model has been mentioned to be closely watched in order to 
revise Colombia’s drug policies and thereby contribute to the peace processes (Polo: 
2015, 6). Though not fully legalized, in November 2014, the Colombian Senate 
passed a law regulating the use of cannabis for medical purposes (Álvarez: 2014) 
using a similar rationale than described in subsection 3.1 on Uruguay. A month 
earlier, in October 2014, Chile also passed a law legalizing cannabis strictly for 
medical purposes (Gurney: 2014). In this case, though, the law stipulates the state to 
be the sole producer and supplier of the drug, based on Uruguay’s statist model, but 
without allowing self-farming or cannabis clubs. Guatemala’s president Pérez Molina, 
who had been an active promoter of legalization previous to Uruguay’s measure (see 
subsection 1.3), praised José Mujica’s decision and assured he would closely follow 
the case. Soon after, in February 2014, he established the ‘National Commission for 
Drug Policy Reform’ to study the current situation of the country in order to take a 
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decision by 2015 and possibly becoming the second country to fully legalize cannabis 
(Menguzzato: 2014).  
 
3.3.3.	  Prospects	  of	  future	  Developments	  in	  Latin	  America’s	  Drug	  Reforms	  
 
Regarding the prospects of drug policy reforms in Latin America, there is significant 
potential for change in the following years. As discussed in paragraph 1.3.2, Latin 
America continues to be divided on the drug policy debates and even though 
Colombia and Mexico have embraced the idea of reform and have already partially 
decriminalized the use of cannabis, Brazil has not shown any signs yet of softening its 
prohibitionist and punitive model (Boiteux: 2015, 144). Given the powerful role of 
Brazil in the region, it will be important to take into account their stance on the issue. 
Though the government has kept a cautious position in the debates and former 
president FHC has spoken in favor of legalization, real action remains to be seen. 
However, as a result of the pressure of the presidents of Colombia, Mexico and 
Guatemala in September 2012, the next United Nations General Assembly Special 
Session (UNGASS) on Drugs was moved from 2019 to 2016 (“UNGASS 2016”: 
2015), the last one being in 1998. By January 2015, Barra pointed out that “at the 
moment, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Uruguay have started important 
work that they will present in the reunion. For their efforts to be compelling, it is 
important that the rest of the hemisphere joins the quest for a new global consensus 
around drugs” (2015, 93)9. Youngers asserted in this regard that “reform-oriented 
countries in other parts of the world are looking to Latin America to take the lead in 
pushing for debate and, above all, the beginning of meaningful reform at the 2016 
UNGASS” (2014, 22). In Spain, for instance, where cannabis clubs find themselves in 
a legal grey area, the number of these associations keeps growing, as they trust in an 
international inertia towards cannabis legalization started by Uruguay and pushed 
forward by leaders all throughout Latin America (Escofet: 2014). As Pien Metaal 
emphasized: “Uruguay has inspired many countries to at least take a few steps in that 
direction. It is not possible to go back. The genie came out of the bottle and there is 
no way to get him back inside” (Abiven: 2015). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 As translated by the author of this paper. 
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Conclusion	  
 
All in all, Uruguay’s decision of becoming the world’s first country to fully legalize 
cannabis has proven to play an important role in Latin America’s new discourse 
towards drug policies. There are several concrete conclusions to be drawn from the 
above analysis explaining the role more specifically, as shall be exposed throughout 
this conclusion. Firstly, though Uruguay received much credit for challenging the 
status quo, it had played a rather limited role prior to such decision. As described in 
subsection 1.3, several Latin American leaders started speaking out in favor of a new 
paradigm on drug policies, explicitly denouncing the failure of the since 1971 U.S.-
led ‘war on drugs’ as well as the international drug control regime, which has been 
since 1961 dictating a prohibitionist model through the three UN conventions on 
drugs (see paragraph 1.1.1). Since 2001, U.S. foreign policy has been focusing more 
on other regions and U.S. influence decreased in the region. Thereby, consistent to 
Armenta and Jelsma’s analysis, Latin America increasingly took over the lead in the 
regional drug policy debates, especially since 2009, the year that Bolivia denounced 
the UN ban on coca leaf and the year that former Latin American presidents Cardoso, 
Zedillo and Gaviria published the report Drugs & Democracy: Toward a paradigm 
shift. As the drug debates were thereby brought to the regional agenda, sitting 
presidents Santos and Molina publicly supported the idea of cannabis legalization and 
with the additional support of Mexican president Nieto, they pushed at the UN to 
reschedule the next UNGASS on drugs to take place in 2016 instead of 2019. They 
also pushed the OAS to study the drug problem in the Americas, resulting in a 
groundbreaking report in 2013 that encouraged the experimentation of new 
approaches to drugs such as the legal regulation. By the end of that year, Uruguay did 
exactly that. Though the Uruguayan government started to actively participate in the 
debates since June 2012, announcing the intention of legalizing cannabis for the first 
time, its role in the region really became relevant once the law came into reality. 
 
Secondly, though Uruguay’s decision caused a few diplomatic tensions at 
first, it is the general lack of negative repercussions that has marked the development 
of Latin America’s discourse towards drug policies. Given the history of U.S. 
hegemony and interventionism in the region and their imposition of prohibitionist 
drug policies (see subsection 2.2), the absence of actions taken against Uruguay and 
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the continuance of normal diplomatic relations between the two countries marked the 
way towards a new paradigm in the Americas. As Walsh asserted, the timing for 
Uruguay’s step was very convenient as increasingly more states within the U.S. have 
been legalizing the drug, leaving the federal government at an awkward position to 
dictate other countries’ policies while allowing the legalization at the domestic level. 
In fact, the tensions occurred instead with some regional neighbors such as Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Mexico, worried either about the consequences across borders or 
about a fragmenting regional cooperative consensus. However, Uruguay’s marginal 
role in the regional drug trafficking has allowed the continuance of the legalization 
project and has even been praised to be an appropriately small context for such an 
experiment. Eventually, Uruguay received the support from regional organizations 
such as the OAS, UNASUR and MERCOSUR and successfully brought the drug 
debates to the forefront in these platforms. As Uruguay has endured the domestic and 
international obstacles (see subsection 3.2), countries around Latin America have 
taken note of this and have felt encouraged to move further away from the 
prohibitionist and punitive approach. Guatemala, for instance, established a 
commission to study the options for legalization, Colombia passed a law regulating 
medical cannabis, and Chile even adopted part of Uruguay’s model by selling state-
grown cannabis for medical purposes. As such, Uruguay has become a reference point 
and pioneer on drug reforms in Latin America and throughout the world, where 
reform-minded countries are closely following the case and its potential spread. 
 
Thirdly, Uruguay contributed to Latin America’s discourse on drug 
policies by promoting a stronger human rights and harm reduction approach within 
the drug debates. Scholars such as Barra, Metaal and Youngers have promoted such 
approach within the academic debate and denounced the collateral effects of the war 
on drugs, including high levels of violence, threat to democratic governance, power 
concentration of criminal drug organizations, marginalization of drug users, high 
imprisonment rates, etc. The socio-economic costs have been high and the discussions 
have shifted from treating drug consumers as criminals to addressing them as 
potential patients to be treated and/or as citizens entitled to consumer rights and 
freedom. In addition, scholars as well as political leaders in favor of legally regulating 
cannabis like alcohol and tobacco, aim to take power away from criminal hands and 
protect the consumers from the unregulated black markets, especially given the fact 
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that production and consumption have increased even after decades of substantial 
investments in the eradication. Incorporating these academic discussions into the 
political sphere, Uruguay defended the decision of legalizing cannabis under these 
rationales (see subsection 3.1) and justified the conflict with the UN conventions to 
the international community by emphasizing its prioritization of human rights 
protection. In a region often characterized by ideological divides, it is noteworthy to 
point out that the pathway of cannabis legalization has received support from leaders 
from wide-reaching political spectrums, from Bachelet’s and Mujica’s leftist 
governments to Santos’ and Molina’s conservative ones, an indication for a wide 
consensus across Latin America towards a new paradigm. Uruguay’s role is 
characterized by its leadership in bringing Latin American governments together 
towards a human rights approach (see paragraph 3.3.3). 
 
Fourthly, though Uruguay fueled the debates towards a new paradigm on 
drug policies, countries around Latin America and the world have been rather 
reluctant to take similar action and prefer to follow and study the development and 
results of the Uruguayan project first. Besides the few cases mentioned in paragraph 
3.3.2, the action was limited despite the widespread debates. Presidents, policy 
makers, and activists around Latin America have praised the Uruguayan government 
for challenging the traditional approach, acknowledging its failure, and have shown 
great interest in the new model. However, the international community is being 
cautious not to move too quickly towards a new paradigm and prefers to study the 
pending results of Uruguay’s model in order to confirm whether the objectives, as 
stated in subsection 3.1, will really be met. Uruguay has quickly positioned itself in 
the vanguard of cannabis research, but has not yet fully implemented all components 
of its program, waiting to start its most controversial measure, namely the sale of 
state-grown cannabis in pharmacies. The prospects of future widespread changes in 
regional drug policies greatly depend on the successes or failures of Uruguay’s 
experiment and on the outcome of the UNGASS on drugs in April 2016, in which 
Latin America will play a crucial role. Future research will therefore need to closely 
study the links of Uruguay’s cannabis legalization with potential socio-economic 
changes in violence and crime, public health, and especially the breakdown of 
powerful drug organizations, which is an issue that concerns the entire region and has 
the power to unite Latin America towards a new paradigm on drug policies.  
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